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thetmdtbnel appmechtoinformedon system design snd in-
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icel bases on which these systems smt aervieee have been
develo@ has lad Iibretfens and infwmtim Scientists to
WJWe$J—rn~ is a user eonatmct and therefore
system designs should place greeter emphasis on ueer-cen-
tered appmecbe. ~ia atiiole extenda Dewin’s and Monis’s
tknticsl fremetmxk for designing effective information
asmioes by synthesizing and integmting theory and research
derfvad frommdlipl esppfoecheeinthe aocialsndbehav-
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works todeaignad&tdMed syetemofaocisl co@tionthat
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Strategies to design syatama that auppoft communicetiva
cm@ence and cognhive competence emphasize the utili-
zetionofidmnatbn syetemainaueer—centmd learning en-
vhment. TWeinchdea v&w@cognMon ssagemmtive
pmceae and recognizing the continuing i~
and active involvement of experts, novieas, and technologi-
cal gatekeepers.
Introduction
During the last decade there has been an explosion of
publicly available. large-scale, complex statistical data.
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Whether available locally on diskette or cd-rem or
through Ioeal- or wide-area networks linking an informa-
tion center to another site, access to extensive collections
of complex statistical data has altered the information
use environment. 1 The term da(a complexity is used to
describe datasets derived from censuses, administrative
records, and longitudinal panel surveys that may contain
millions of observations, thousands of data elements
with numerous interdependent relationships, and intri-
cate logical conditions on the measurement process.2
Data complexity connotes an interdependence of or-
ganizational, social, cognitive, and technical require-
ments for understanding, retrieving, and using data.
These very requirements have, however, resulted in un-
derutilization, misuse, and nonuse of complex data by
data users (secondary analysts). Utilization has come at
great cost to individual researchers, the information
community, and to the national information infrastruc-
ture. The knowledge requirements for handling statisti-
cal data are now so extensive that it is no longer possible
for a single researcher working alone to analyze data
without expending significant computational resources
and personal time. There is, however, a growing recogni-
tion that using statistical data efficiently and effectively
requires that the traditional relationship between a data-
set and the user be altered. And now that information
‘ Following Morris ( 1994. p, 20, fn, 1) we use the term “informa-
tion services” to cover all areas that serve users in a library or informa-
tion center.
*What contributes to their complexity are their data structure, rep-
resentation of time in measurements, analysis units and aggregations,
representation in machine readable form, and the extensive amount of
information required to use the data appropriately. For more discus-
sion about the attributes of complexity. see David ( 199I ) and David&
Robbin ( 1990a, 1990b, 1992).
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centers have become more involved in the provision of
data user services, organizational structures must be de-
signed for managing these data in order to improve their
accessibility y and ensure high quality scientific output.
But what should these organizations look like so that
complex data will be used efficiently and effectively by
social scientists and others?
In recent years some librarians and information sci-
entists have articulated increasing dissatisfaction with
the traditional approach to information system design
and information services provision, and, by implication,
the theoretical bases on which these systems and services
have been developed. They argue that professionals must
move awayjiorn an approach that views information or
data as objective, and information or data use as deter-
mined by the expert system designers and system man-
agers as controllers of data resources. They must move
Ioward an approach that posits information as a user
construct and system design as a user-centered enter-
prise. Implied by this change in orientation is that our
conceptions of users, how they perceive information,
and their information needs and uses require a different
theoretical basis for information system design and user
services.
We strongly concur with Dervin ( 1977, 1983, 1992),
Dervin and Nilan ( 1986), and Morris ( 1994) who be-
lieve that a strong theoretical basis must guide informa-
tion center and systems design. This article extends Mor-
ris’s ( 1994) theoretical framework for designing effective
information services, which is derived principally from
cognitive psychology, to embrace theory that derives
from multiple approaches in the social and behavioral
sciences. The discussion also extends Webber’s ( 1991/
92) and Wilson’s ( 1995) arguments regarding the rea-
sons why relevant information goes unused in research,
development, and policy formulation efforts. Diverse
theoretical foundations must be synthesized while atten-
tion is directed to multiple levels of analysis for the pro-
duction of high quality scientific output. These theoreti-
cal frameworks are applied in order to develop general
design strategies and principles for information systems
and services that provide statistical data, in particular,
those data which are designated as complex.
A useful way to develop these strategies and principles
is to focus on what generates or contributes to error in
the production of high quality statistical output. The key
deterrent is inadequate communication about da~a.
Communication failures lead to error production both
by the data producing agent and by secondary analysts.
Communication failures obscure the location and
sources of error in the data production process and con-
tribute to the diminished quality of scientific output.
They also impede improvements in the scientific design
of future data collections. Thus, as a first step towards
developing organizational structures to manage complex
data, it is clear that how error is produced within the pro-
cesses of data production and data utilization must be
understood. Developers can then apply this understand-
ing to designing communication and information sys-
tems that help users discover, understand, and control
error.
This article shows how diverse theoretical frameworks
and a large body of research contribute to developing
useful strategies and principles for designing a distrib-
uted system of social interaction, communication, and
cognition that facilitates error detection, diagnosis, and
correction for complex statistical data. Such strategies
support systems in which sense-making and interpreta-
tive processes are encouraged and operate in a social
context.
A distributed system of social cognition recognizes
that traditional approaches to understanding data pro-
duction and utilization are inadequate. The underlying
assumption behind the design of nearly all organizations
and information systems that produce or use complex
data has been that the end user is a single, isolated indi-
vidual who operates on complex data through the com-
puter. This perspective is faulty. Data production and
secondary analysis are carried out in a social context.
They depend as much on social interactions and ex-
changes among individuals and groups as they require a
range of cognitive reasoning processes. Such social in-
teractions and exchanges require large-scale, bureau-
cratic organizations to organize, routinize, and manage
data production activities associated with panel surveys,
administrative records, and censuses. Individuals in-
volved in data production and use must collaborate on a
daily basis to complete a large variety of routine and non-
routine tasks. This means that people search for and ob-
tain assistance from one another; they seek help and
learn from peers and experts. Taylor’s ( 1968, 1986,
1991 ), Taylor and Utterback’s ( 1975), and Garvey’s
( 1979) studies on communication behavior of scientists
and engineers reinforce the contention that the proper
focus must be the social situation. This includes the rela-
tionship between the user-scientist and her environment,
whose major constraints and resources are other scien-
tists and complex bureaucratic organizations that pro-
vide data, interpretations, and other forms of user ser-
vices.
The dynamic and loosely coupled nature of social in-
teractions and social cognition which underlie the data
production and utilization processes create problems in
understanding what the data mean and the appropriate
uses to which they can be applied. This occurs because
knowledge and discoveries about the data are not re-
corded or communicated in any systematic or shared
way. Information about the data, including its uses and
limitations, is often revealed only through informal dia-
logues and conversations.
A physical structure for this distributed system of so-
cial cognition is neither devised or prescribed. Rather,
fundamental theoretical principles relevant for designing
systems that more effectively and efficiently produce and
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facilitate using complex data will be identified and elab-
orated. These principles are guided, as Norman ( 1983a,
1988b), Senge ( 1990 ) and others have argued, by appre-
ciation for the roles played by: 1) The mental models of
those who work in organizations that produce and utilize
complex data; 2 ) the practices of individuals engaged in
data production and social science inquiry; and 3) the
concepts associated with the design of information sys-
tems to collect, process, and utilize complex data that are
embedded in learning organizations.
By elaborating the theoretical foundations of the so-
cial, interactive processes of data production, scientific
discovery and knowledge production, information sys-
tems can be designed that will improve the quality of
complex data and secondary analysis. As such, this arti-
cle is an effort to use theory to design tools that can result
in higher quality data and contribute to fundamental im-
provements in scientific practices.
Part One discusses the core assumptions, definitions,
and concepts underlying a framework for a distributed
system of social cognition to detect, diagnose, communi-
cate, and learn from error. Attention is focused on
different types of error that occur through various orga-
nizational, social, and cognitive processes. Understand-
ing the different types of error and their underlying as-
sumptions serves as a critical foundation for recommen-
dations on design strategies and principles. In Part Two,
the concepts of error and social cognition are defined,
five types of error are identified, and the relationship be-
tween cognitive development and social interaction is
explained. This section concludes with a summary of the
assumptions and offers a series of propositions to link the
assumptions about communication processes, the pro-
duction of knowledge, and error. Part Three offers two
general design strategies for a distributed system of social
cognition to detect, diagnose, communicate, and learn
from error. Our strategies to design for communicative
competence and cognitive competence emphasize the
utilization of information systems in a learning environ-
ment, social cognition as a generative process, and the
interdependence and active involvement of experts and
novices. Principles are adapted from design rules based
on analyses of human error and derived from assess-
ments of communication/ information technologies to
support and enhance work group performance.
Designing user-centered, distributed systems of social
cognition requires theory and knowledge from several
disciplines. We draw freely on and extrapolate from the-
ory as well as field and laboratory research on organiza-
tions and social networks, scientific collaboration in co-
operative work groups, learning and cognition, and
human-computer interaction to examine the data pro-
duction and secondary analysis of longitudinal panel
surveys. The argument is located in different theoretical
traditions that use different concepts and terminology to
express essentially similar meanings and that emphasize
different aspects of how organizations and individuals
process information and construct meaning. This is not
to argue, however, that the assumptions and premises of
these different theories are the same. Rather, emphasized
is that the understanding of information systems design
will be enriched by integrating different theoretical ap-
proaches. Theory and practice are used to establish a
framework for a task system of data production and uti-
lization that maximizes the ability of people operating in
that system to detect and learn from error.
Throughout this article, examples are used to illus-
trate theory and concepts. These examples and recom-
mendations for developing strategies are drawn from ex-
periences with two complex, dynamic longitudinal panel
surveys that have served as sources for significant social
policy decisions. The first dataset is the Survey o~fncorne
and Program Participation ( SYPP), a longitudinal panel
study to examine the economic well-being of Americans,
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census ( Ryscavage,
1987 ). The second is the Wisconsin Child Support Re-
form Program (Garfinkel et al., 1988), a project carried
out by the Institute for Research on Poverty at the Uni-
versit y of Wisconsin-Madison, which collected and inte-
grated data from court and other administrative sources
produced by many, independent administrative units for
10 cohorts (panels) and also conducted related sample
surveys for a period between 1980 and 1995. While the
examples offered to support the argument are undeni-
ably complicated, they serve as important illustrations
of the statistical data that are commonly used by social
scientists who are engaged in public policy research and
evaluation.
Part One. Framework Assumptions
Three basic assumptions are critical to the focus of
this article and recommendations for design principles.
The first assumption is that error is inevitable and almost
certain to occur because data production and utilization
systems are loosely coupled and because organizational,
technical, and cognitive processes are very complicated.
The second assumption is that data production and use
are communication processes, articulated by language,
which take place in a social context. Errors that occur in
and about a set of data not only pertain to the errors in
measurement of the data themselves, but also encompass
misinterpretations and miscommunication about the
data, their measurement, and their meanings. This
means that people can learn about error, and that errors
in the data and the data production and utilization pro-
cesses can be identified, corrected, controlled, and used
as a source for long-term learning opportunities.
Assumption 1. Error
The complexity of the organizational, social, and
technical processes embedded in data production and
use means that the occurrence of error is inevitable (cf.
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Norman, 1983a, 1983b, 1986a, 1986, 1988a, 1988b).
Error is socially produced in the processes of data pro-
duction and data utilization.
Data production process. The complexity of these
processes means that data producers will always produce
public data files that contain error. The data producer’s
technology and its structural properties introduce error
that finds its way into public use datasets and its subse-
quent utilization. One example illustrates the role that
organizational factors play in introducing error into the
production and subsequent use of complex data.
The administrative complexity of record keeping
practices creates failures in the transfer of data and infor-
mation between governmental agencies. This contri-
butes, for example, to significant errors and high rates
of missing data in the Wisconsin Child Support Reform
Program data set. Collection of child support payments
and related data by the county Clerks of Courts depends
on several critical steps and contingencies that required
efforts of several other public agencies. Each agency has
its own base of authority, power, and discretion, with its
own complex set of rules, procedures, and meanings
about the data and how they will be collected, processed,
and used. To illustrate, wage assignment information
about non-custodial parents who are legally required to
pay child support is received by the county Clerk of
Courts, based upon reports from employers who are re-
quired to withhold child support under Wisconsin law.
Some of the decision rules and contingencies that oper-
ate to make the data complex include the extent to
which: 1) The non-custodial parent is employed; 2 ) an
employer is notified that a current or prospective em-
ployee has been ordered to pay child support; 3 ) an em-
ployee is paid wages or salary through an employer’s pay-
roll system or on a “cash” (non-reported) basis; 4) an
employer notifies the Clerk of Courts of the wage assign-
ment; 5 ) the Department of Industry and Labor Re-
lations notifies the county Clerk of Courts about the em-
ployment status of the non-custodial parent; and(6) the
county Clerk of Courts has an up-to-date record of the
court order which assigns child support payments. Wage
assignment information may also be received through
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue or Internal Rev-
enue Service (U.S. Department of Treasury). At several
points in this process, public or private agents contribute
information regarding wage assignment to child support
payments. At each point, errors can occur in reporting,
recording, or interpreting wage and eligibility y data, in-
cluding reconciling two or more “correct” versions of the
data. Furthermore, considerable lag time may occur be-
tween collection, recording, and transfer of such data
among administrative units. This “transfer lag” can con-
tribute to additional error, because current information
may be commingled with older, obsolete information
and thus may create false, misleading, or missing infor-
mation. One effect of delays in the transfer of informa-
tion between administrative units is that information
about the child support payment is not yet available at
the time that other data collection efforts take place in
the field.
Data utilization process. The production and use of
complex data depend upon learning processes. For ana-
lysts charged with “making sense” of the data, the lear-
ningprocess means that analysts will always make errors.
Seifert and Hutchins ( 1989, p. 42 ) contend that the fun-
damental reason why errors will inevitably be made is
because use of the data relies on “learning on the job.”
And, they explain, “where there is the need for learning,
there is the potential for error.”
A different example illustrates how the data producer
introduces the potential for analyst error. We often find
that data are duplicated in public use files. For example,
public use files produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus contain variables that are used for both internal Bu-
reau data processing and analysis and external secondary
analysis by researchers. The public use files of the Survey
of Income and Program Parlicipalion ( SIPP) contain
original questionnaire items, recoded variables of origi-
nal questionnaire items, constructed variables derived
from recoded or original questionnaire items, and impu-
tation flags of the original questionnaire items and re-
coded variables. Many original questionnaire items also
appear in edited and unedited form, but most users ex-
pect “only one variable for each concept, not two or
more” ( McMillen, 1990, p. 1). Complexity introduced
by the Bureau’s data collection and processing require-
ments adds immeasurable complexity to the data, its po-
tential and often competing interpretations or meaning,
and its likely uses in producing supportable, analytical
results. Organizational, social, and technical processes
associated with data production and utilization intro-
duce uncertainty and create ambiguity in the meaning,
interpretation, and quality of the data.
Severe limits on the abilities of human beings to pro-
cess large amounts of information and to know its mean-
ings and constraints also contribute to the production of
error and to an incapacity to uncover errors. This occurs
because analysts cannot remember thousands of vari-
ables and the logical conditions that apply to the mea-
surement of each variable. For example, to create a cross-
sectional sample from the SIPP often requires examin-
ing a series of attributes in the interview under investiga-
tion as well as in prior and subsequent interviews. Creat-
ing a cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis file also re-
quires examining data on the interview status, sample
relevance, and demographic characteristics of the re-
spondent in every interview. Such linkages run counter
to the expectation that each cross-sectional interview is
independent of any prior interview, The variations in
how the data were collected and the analyst’s expectation
of logical independence (based upon concepts of statisti-
cal independence ) has consequently resulted in signifi-
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cant errors when analysts attempt to create extracts from
these public use files.
McMillen ( 1990, p. 1) has also observed that analysts
make errors about the different concepts of time embed-
ded in the Survey oflncome and Program Participation.
This is because some data are collected for specific weeks,
all weeks, months, two or more months, or all months in
the reference period of an interview. Each time interval
requires an understanding of the calendar that corre-
sponds to the reference period in each of four indepen-
dently drawn subsamples. He notes that “Disaggregating
data collected for several months and aggregating data
collected below the monthly data provide a variety of
sources of confusion and error.” Indeed, different modes
of time—survey time, reference time, and calendar
time—have been a continuing source of misunderstand-
ing and, ultimately, errors produced by analysts.
Why does error occur? Norman ( 1983b, p. 8) con-
cludes, after careful study of human error and human-
machine interaction. that
most people’s understanding of the devices they interact
with is surprisingly meager, imprecisely specified, and
full of inconsistencies, gaps, and idiosyncratic quirks.
The models that people bring to bear on a task are not
the precise, elegant models. . . Rather, they contain
only partial descriptions of operations and huge areas of
uncertainties. Moreover, people often feel uncertain of
their knowledge-even when it is in fact complete and
correct-and their mental models include statements
about the degree of certainty they feel for different as-
pects of their knowledge.
In a later analysis, Norman ( 1988b, p. 114) adds that
mistakes derive from various sources, which include
“poor decision making, misclassifying a situation, or fail-
ing to take all the relevant factors into account.” People
rely on faulty memory or remembered experiences and
do not apply systematic analysis to the task at hand. Fur-
thermore, they routinely minimize the amount of infor-
mation they need to make decisions “or the complete-
ness, precision, accuracy, or depth of the learning” that
is required to peflorm a task (p. 55). They do, however,
make use of constraints “that simplify what must be re-
tained in memory” (p. 61). Relatedly, Simon ( 1979),
relying on his studies into the limits of human informa-
tion processing, has noted that the process of decision
making is serial, selective, and satisficing. Decision mak-
ers obtain just enough information to solve the task or
problem at hand. Considerable research into psycholog-
ical and behavioral aspects of human judgment and de-
cision making support this claim, as well ( Nisbett &
Ross, 1980 Slovic, Fischhoff, & Liechtenstein, 1977;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Observations of those who work in data producing
organizations and who practice social science lead to
the conclusion that both producers and users generate
many different errors during the various phases of data
production and utilization. This occurs because of in-
sufficient knowledge and experience needed to un-
derstand the data, faulty application of past experience
to a new dataset, and the technical requirements of the
tasks at hand.
The traditional response to preparing public use files
illustrates this problem. The Bureau of the Census op-
erates like most other data producers. Attributes
(variables) for a given record are all organized in sequen-
tial order and represented in a standard flat file or rectan-
gular matrix structure. This has two consequences. The
structure of such files completely obscures many of the
logical relationships between attributes; this often vio-
lates the intent of the original scientific design. A second
consequence is that much of the data designed into a sur-
vey’s complex response structure is thrown away. Much
of the data that is thrown away provides information
about important relationships between different sets of
measurements made on different units and levels of anal-
ysis. As the Panel to Evaluate the Survey oflncorne and
Program Participation noted in their final report, pro-
cessing of data in the form of a flat file structure de-
stroyed certain classes of household relationship net-
works created in the questionnaire which could not be
recreated (National Research Council, 1993b; Olsen,
David, & Sheets, 1991).
The same logic of organizing data is embedded in
the Wisconsin Child Support Reform Program, as well.
Data for the panels are organized in a rectangular ma-
trix structure with all attributes associated with one
unit of analysis, regardless of what was measured. In
the child support project, this “standard” unit of anal-
ysis is the case file ( court record of separation, divorce,
or paternity), despite the fact that there are many
different units of analysis measured as part of child
support proceedings (e.g., data measured for families,
children, custodial parents, non-custodial parents, and
social welfare “cases” ). The standard file structure
eliminates essential data relationships between differ-
ent measures for different units of analysis ( e.g., moth-
ers, fathers, individual children ) over time. This oc-
curs despite the fact that such data relationships al-
ready exist in the structure of court records, tax
records, and social assistance case records.
Both the data producer and user experience difficul-
ties with understanding and effectively handling com-
plex data because they lack sufficiently well-developed
conceptual schema to apply or augment existing knowl-
edge to new situations that use complex data. Relying on
existing rules developed through past practices with
other types of data often presents constraints that do not
help them understand the structure and meaning of new
forms of data. Furthermore, the production and use of
new types of data require that both the data producer
and data user solve complicated (e.g., ill-structured and
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unstructured ) problems.3 Few data producers are, how-
ever, experienced with producing longitudinal surveys or
preparing data from administrative records. In general,
both producer and user assume that the same set of rules
and procedures developed from past practices apply to
new situations involving new types of data. In many
cases, this means that they incorrectly apply past rules
and procedures to process longitudinal data that are
based on their experiences with cross-sectional survey
data. Similarly, researchers make errors because their
tools, experiences, and specific knowledge pertaining to
a data set are inadequate.4
Assumption 2. Communication
Language organizes the categories of our social reality
and structures the way in which we approach situations.
Language communicates our interpretations of the em-
pirical world and allows us to express our schema or
mental model about objects, events, and people that
evoke our attention ( Rogoff, 1990; Schutz, 1962, 1964,
1967 ). Scientific concepts and technical terminology are
used to communicate about complex data. This form of
communication includes verbal and nonverbal cues that
help organize useful categories for creating meaning and
understanding based on individual and collective con-
structions of social reality.
lnferpre!ive processes. Data are an important prod-
uct of an interpretive process in which language forms
are converted from expressive utterances or discourse to
symbolic representations. The conversion from dis-
course to symbolic representations ( such as symbols and
~We rely on Mintzberg. Raisinghani, & Theoret, ( 1976, p. 246 ) for
the definition of unstructured. Unstructured refers to “decision pro-
cesses that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for
which no predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in
the organ ization. ” Winograd and Ftores ( 1987, p. 153) explain that
structured tasks are those that follow a set of rules that can be pro-
grammed by a computer. but no such rules exist for unstructured prob-
lems. They use the term semi-structured to define those tasks which
“recur but not so much that one can fully specify the relevant rules.”
4 Both the data prducer’s and researcher’s capability 10avoid error
requires three different domains of knowledge: Tools (programming
languages, statistical programs, database languages. computer operat-
ing systems); experience ( survey design and field problems, admin-
istrative record systems, very large databases, published empirical
studies); and, specific knowledge (information pertaining to the data
set acquired from past work on the data or prior work as the data pro-
ducer (see David & Robbin, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 2 1-24). In an earlier
article by David ( 1980. p. 329), he adds that a knowledge of computer
science is “helpful for clarifying the logical structure of the data and
implications of that structure for analysis,” in addition to improving
upon efficiency through particular types of programming, and “tech-
niques for assessing the numerical accuracy of our results, so we can
avoid the delusion of accuracy in a set of results.” Since we do not
expect that this fourth domain of knowledge is part of the knowledge
base of the social scientist, our design strategies discussed below em-
body this knowledge in an expert.
text ) involves socially active individuals interacting
through various conversational modes to establish a con-
sensus on the meanings, significations, and signs at-
tached to the production and use of data.
Interpretation is “inextricably interwoven with the
context” of data production, which “includes [the]
physical and conceptual structure of [members of the
organization ] as well as the purpose of the activity and
the milieu in which it is embedded” ( Rogoff & Lave,
1984, p. 2). For example, rules and procedures for cod-
ing data from administrative records by a data collector
or for judging the acceptability of a response from a hu-
man subject by an interviewer will reflect certain pre-es-
tablished and usually learned categories for organizing
the collection of the data. These rules, procedures, and
categories are designed to eliminate ambiguity in the in-
terpretative process.
Two examples illustrate these situations. For more
than 5 years, coders for the Wisconsin Child Support
Demonstration Program systematically ignored data that
did not fit the pre-established categories created by the
research team for the design of the initial data collection.
It was only when the amount of data not being coded
increased significantly, that some coders began to ques-
tion the stability of the rules and procedures and the
effectiveness of the pre-established categories. Substan-
tial ambiguity had thus been introduced into the data
collection process. As with other data produced by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census, researchers who use the Sur-
vev of Income and Program Participation possess virtu-
ally no information on “Don’t Know” responses. This is
because the Bureau has a policy of not allowing “missing
data” in public use files. (This is accomplished by esti-
mating valid values for missing data based upon the data
values for similar, matched, sets of records during the
data processing stage.) The Bureau’s editing system also
eliminates response inconsistencies (e.g., eliminating
variations in a subject’s response to questions about gen-
der, race, age, or marital status during subsequent
interviews ). This occurs even if an inconsistency makes
sense within a particular context.
These two examples also illustrate the length of the
communication chain for the data production process,
which involves data collection, entry, and conversion of
response data to machine readable form, editing and re-
vision, and storage, retrieval, and management (Clark,
1986 ). At each stage in the process, interpretation, sense-
making, and construction of meaning are required to
generate a shared sense of understandings about what the
data represent and how they can be used. Interpretation,
sense-making and construction of meaning will vary,
however. They will be different because the production
of complex data necessarily requires contributions by
different agencies and staff with different duties, tasks,
authority, and responsibilities. Understandings and
knowledge about the data, what they mean, and how
they can be or are used, will differ according to the char-
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acteristics of the tasks performed by each agency or staff
member.
Thus, for example, administering a large-scale na-
tional survey like the Survey of Income and Program
Participation is a complicated organizational process, in-
volving many different organizational units and staff dis-
tributed over many sites. Many different units at the U.S.
Bureau of the Census are necessary to manage the pro-
duction of public use files. One unit is responsible for the
scientific design of the survey. Another unit is responsi-
ble for data collection. Other units are responsible for
assessing data quality and for entering and processing
(transforming) responses obtained in the field into ma-
chine readable form. Another unit develops the algo-
rithms that recode variables, impute missing items, sta-
tistically match missing interviews, and create aggrega-
tions for new types of analysis. And yet another unit,
either inside the Bureau or as an independent organiza-
tion, prepares and distributes public use files and their
documentation. Thus, a great deal of information does
not get communicated clearly, consistently, or in a
timely manner across these organizational units.
Furthermore, members of these units may have little
or nothing to do with each other because the tasks related
to data production are earned out separately and semi-
autonomously in a loosely coupled organization with lit-
tle or no feed-forward or feedback processes. A direct
consequence of this loosely coupled, semi-autonomous
data production system is that it substantially contr-
ibutes to the production of error, including not docu-
menting the data and the data production process. It is
important to emphasize, however, that the production of
error is not simply a problem of poor performance or
lack of training or experience on the part of staff. Rather,
it is a natural part of the social context and social milieu,
reflecting complex, yet loosely coupled interdependent
relationships over many sites.
Interpretations, understandings, and knowledge of
the data generated by each organizational unit are not
institutionalized as part of the data producer’s repertoire
of competencies. These understandings do not become
part of the data producer’s “memory,” and are therefore
permanently lost (Dolby, Clark, & Rogers, 1986). For
example, many processing decisions related to the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation were never for-
mally recorded by members of the U.S. Bureau of the
Census outside the code embedded in editing programs.
Even analysts inside one administrative unit could not
obtain information about decisions made by pro-
grammers who were located in another unit. Decisions
about which data were excluded from the public use files
but which had appeared in the original survey instru-
ments were not formally documented for secondary
analysis. Descriptions about recoded variables and about
most imputations of data values to missing data or miss-
ing interviews were “never made (and, we suspect, never
documented ). Analysts were never informed that many
variables were unedited. Releases of corrected public use
files were not accompanied by information on which ob-
servations, variables, or values were modified.
Yet another, different, interpretive process occurs
when the data are used. Usually far removed from the
organizational routines of data production, users make
inferences in order to make sense of the data. Like mem-
bers of the data producing organization, their back-
ground knowledge is a product of prior cognitive skills,
motivation, social experiences, and the problem-solving
context ( Butterworth & Light, 1982; Hannaway, 1989;
Hastorf & Isen, 1982; McPhee & Tompkins, 1985; Mi-
troff & Mason, 1981; Roloff & Berger, 1982). Inter-
pretations will therefore differ between users and mem-
bers of the data producing organization, because differ-
ences in accumulated knowledge derived from everyday
experiences rely on a different language about data and
reflect different goals and problems.
The implication is that a “common ground” ( Clark &
Carlson, 1982) of understanding cannot be assumed and
may not be possible. Members of data producing organi-
zations and users have different understandings of the
data that are grounded in different assumptions—what
Krauss and Fussell ( 1990) call the “mutual knowledge
problem.”
Because communication failure characterizes both
the data production and use environments, it results in
reduced effectiveness and inefficiency in the scientific
process. Trial and error prevail as users make discoveries
about the quality of the data. Yet, as this source of ex-
pertise develops, users who have investigated and
learned about the data do not have a vehicle for collating
and communicating knowledge and expertise derived
from their experiences. New cohorts of users encounter
the same problems and make the same discoveries re-
peatedly. Because there is little or no feedback commu-
nication with the data producer, documentation and im-
provement to scientific designs and data collection pro-
cedures do not occur.
A distributed task system of social cognition therefore
depends on the ability to “construct a common cognitive
environment” inside the data producing organization
and between the data producer and user, that is, to “as-
certain and represent the information that. . . can (and
will ) be assumed to be known to all” ( Krauss & Fu.ssW,
1990, p. 112). As Rogoff and Gardner ( 1984, p. 97)
comment, “People who are concerned with jointly ac-
complishing a cognitive performance must possess or
create a common framework for the coordination of in-
formation.”
Storage and retrieval of communication as informa-
tion: Cognitive structures. The complexity of the data
comes about, in part, because the elements of a dataset
are closely related to one another. That is, decisions are
made about one element without taking account of
other, related elements, and thereby will lead to the oc-
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currence of error. For example, it is easy to make a sig-
nificant error in extracting a subsample of the population
in the Suwev qfIncome and Program Participation. The
analyst cannot extract individuals based only on the (i)
interview status (e.g., adult, child, proxy, etc.) for a par-
ticular interview without knowing whether the individ-
ual was (ii ) interviewed during the particular time period
under investigation, and (iii ) sample relevant for that
time period (i.e., months during which an individual was
properly part of the sample). Retrieving only on ( i) will
almost always result in an incorrect subset of cases that
will include some individuals who were not actually in-
terviewed (e.g., the cases were imputed or no informa-
tion was ever collected ) and will also exclude other indi-
viduals who should have been interviewed for that tem-
poral period.
Because the information requirements associated
with using complex data are extensive, a significant
amount of information must be investigated for deci-
sions related to extracting cases and measures and con-
ducting analysis. Conceptual complexity requires a sig-
nificant search through multiple paths, as well as trial
and error. A critical element of the task system is, there-
fore, organizing information to inform the researcher
about how to avoid error.
How do we organize the structure of information
about error to make it accessible, reduce uncertainty and
ambiguity, focus attention, provide relevant cues, and
avoid information overload? For some insights into
how to organize the structure of communication/
information about error, theory and empirical research
in cognitive psychology draws attention to different as-
pects of information acquisition, processing and use, and
the limitations in human information processing
[Norman, 1988b; Simon, 1979; and others (cf., Hippier,
Schwarz, & Sudman, 1987)]. Cognitive psychology re-
flects a clear commitment to the information processing
paradigm, which, as Bodenhausen and Wyer ( 1987, p.
7) note, has not been without critics for its theoretical
utility in “predicting phenomena of the ‘real world’ out-
side the laboratory.” This paradigm should not be re-
jected, however. because it has potential utility for un-
derstanding how information is processed and how it
may be more effectively organized and interpreted.
This theory makes the following argument about hu-
man information processing and organization: The two
organizing concepts for memory structures that store
and retrieve information are short-term memory ( STM )
and long-term memory ( LTM ) (Simon, 1979). STM
can only hold a limited number of chunks of informa-
tion, but the number of chunks can be increased by prac-
tice ( Goleman, 1994 ). Simon ( 1979, pp. 41-42) ex-
plains that LTM maybe thought of as an encyclopedia,
with a text and an index; information is accessed via
pointers that comprise the index. The text has an asso-
ciative structure-” a system of nodes interconnected by
numerous links. Information can be retrieved from it not
only via the index but also by following paths of links
from one node to another through intermediate nodes. ”
Recognition is retrieval using the index, whereas associ-
ation is retrieval using sequences of links. Association is
slow, but the power to discriminate and recognize can
be increased by elaborating the index. Information for
assisting in the decision process can be organized so that
it has a wide or narrow and deep or shallow tree structure
(Norman, 1988b, pp. 121-123). Most everyday tasks
are shallow and narrow: They require little planning, rely
on trial and error, and have few decision alternatives. In
contrast, decisions about complex data can be said to
have a wide and deep decision tree structure. They re-
quire prolonged search, evaluation, extensive planning,
trial and error, and problem solving (careful reasoning
and thinking through alternatives). The tasks are diffi-
cult. Decisions are not straightfomvard and “answers are
not readily deducible” (Norman, 1988b, p. 125).
What are the implications for organizing information
about complex data? Shallow and narrow structures will
minimize the mental computations required for search-
ing, retrieving, and evaluating information. As Norman
( 1988b, p. 125) suggests, “If a structure is shallow, then
width is not important. If the structure is narrow, depth
is not important.” The model of bounded-rationality can
be applied as a guide to organizing information: Follow
an incremental strategy of “dividing the difficulties at the
outset and attacking them piecemeal; this is a cumulative
strategy, parsimonious in its use of mechanisms and in-
hospitable toad hoc solutions” (Simon, 1979, pp. x-xi ).
And, finally, tools can be developed that assist in making
associations and indexing information to improve there-
trieval process.
Commtinication network structures. What types of
communication network structures can be created for
effective and efficient interpersonal and group commu-
nication? Four different research programs on commu-
nication yield insights into network structures, although
they make different assumptions about information, us-
ers, and the information use environment (see Lie-
vrouw, 1988, for a discussion of these assumptions).
These include empirical evidence from the late 1940s to
the early 1960s, based on the work of Bavalas ( 1950), 5
Guetzkow and Simon ( 1955), and other experimental
evidence summarized by Shaw ( 1978); studies of com-
munication in the scientific community by Paisley
( 1965, 1972, 1984), Garvey and colleagues ( 1972a,
1972b, 1972c, 1972d), Garvey and Griffith ( 1974), Hag-
strom ( 1965, 1970), Brittain ( 1970), and Eradi and Ut-
terback ( 1984); studies of the role of information or
technological gatekeepers (Allen, 1970, Katz & Tush-
man, 1979; Tushman, 1977; Tushman & Katz, 1980);
s Griffith and Miller ( 1970) and Hesse et al. ( 1993) also found that
productivity was associated with extensive communication networks
and a gatekeeper role.
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and naturalistic observation and survey research on in-
novation diffusion and adoption (see, for example, Fin-
holt & Sproull, 1990; Finholt, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1990;
Rogers, 1994; Rogers & Kincaid, 198 1).
Communication patterns within groups influence
user satisfaction, effectiveness, and efficiency with regard
to the distribution of information and task completion.
The early laboratory experiments demonstrated that the
network’s structural characteristics, such as centraliza-
tion and decentralization, had major consequences for
communication and task performance. Centralized net-
works appeared to be more efficient when they only re-
quired the collection of information in one place,
whereas decentralized networks were more efficient
when tasks were complex and required multiple opera-
tions on the information before the task is completed.
The hub and spoke form of communication appeared
from the experimental evidence to provide an efficient
structure for communicating, collating, and distributing
information. The efficiency of this structure may be ex-
plained by the key role played by a “technological gate-
keeper” or boundary-spanner on whom project groups
rely heavily for information and who contributes to an
organization’s effectiveness by filtering and channeling
external technology and information into the organiza-
tion (Katz & Tushman, 1979). The boundary-spanner
serves as a mediator between “organizational colleagues
and the world outside and effectively couples the organi-
zation to scientific and technological activity in the
world at large” 5 (Allen, 1970, p. 192). It appears that
gatekeepers do not suffer a “communication imped-
ance” that makes communication across information
boundaries “relatively difficult and prone to bias and dis-
tortion” (Katz & Tushman, 1979, p. 143).
Two criticisms were subsequently lodged against this
early laboratory work on communication network struc-
tures. First, it assumed a Shannon-Weaver linear model
of communication, which was vigorously criticized for
its underlying assumption of one-way causality of the
components of the model on communication effects.
Rogers and Kinkaid ( 1981, pp. 34, 37), for example, ar-
gued that this model described the “act” not the process
and was, furthermore, “atomistic and mechanistic.”
(See also Finholt et al., 1990 for a critique of this early
model of communication.) Instead, the extensive re-
search on innovation diffusion and adoption, by fusing
systems theory and social network theory, provided an
alternative model of communication that emphasizes
the “mutual sharing of information in order to achieve
some common purpose, like mutual understanding and/
or collective action” ( Rogers & Kinkaid, 1981, p. 31; see
also Rogers, 1994) .
Second, as Finholt and colleagues ( 1990, p. 297) ob-
served, the electronic network creates a different envi-
ronment than the laboratory setting because electronic
networks provide flexibility and can support different
forms of communication.b Furthermore, they hypothe-
sized that the networks might offer a “new opportunity
to participate in larger, less structured and heterogeneous
groups than the work group” and might give people a
feeling “of increased participation and therefore in-
creased commitment to the organization as a whole”
(Finholt & Sproull, 1990, p. 60). Indeed, evidence from
other projects appears to support their hypothesis that
project success is related to communication and that the
creation of new knowledge derives from the rapid shar-
ing of expertise across subunits and across work groups
regardless of geographic proximity (see Comer, 1983;
Cotter, 1988; David & Robbin, 1992; Hesse, Sproull,
Kiesler, & Walsh, 1993; National Academy of Sciences
et al., 1989; National Research Council, 1993a; Robbin,
1992, 1995; Schatz, 1992; Steele, 1984). Thus, geo-
graphic proximity may be less important than earlier
postulated (but for an opposing argument about geo-
graphic proximity, see Kraut, Egido, & Galegher, 1990 ).
This finding was also supported by research carried out
by Eradi and Utterback ( 1984), who examined the
effects of communication on technological innovation
and found that the frequency of communication in sci-
entific projects was positively correlated with project suc-
cess.
These research findings on communication structures
and boundary-spanning individuals have relevance for
the design of a distributed task system to reduce error
resulting from the production and use of complex data.
These findings suggest that a task system must meet the
functional requirements of coordinating communica-
tion among its members, providing channels for com-
municating, and providing access to and distributing in-
formation. How these functions are performed will vary
across time, contexts and individuals, depending on the
nature of the task, group, and organization/institution
within which the individual and group are located.’
These findings also suggest that we can increase effi-
ciency in communications about error by centralizing
information about error. We would then expect a reduc-
tion in uncertainty, ambiguity and equivocality, as a re-
sult. And we can increase the effectiveness of the research
process by institutionalizing an expert gatekeeper who
bThey note that, “Conditions are quite different in a computer
communication system bekg used to support an ongoing group task.
In particular, although all users of such a system are completely inter-
connected, the flexibility of these connections allow groups, at different
times to create structures that meet their functional needs. This is an
important distinction between these systems and the crude lab appara-
tus employed in the earlier studies. h sugg~ further, that there are
limits to the application of the structural metaphors from these experi-
ments. That is, a system which at one point assumes a functional pat-
tern resembling a spoke and hub, and at another point assumes a func-
tional pattern resembling the circle form cannot really be said to possess
the characteristic sha~ of either of these patterns. Instead, modem
communication systems seem to produce amalgamated forms.”
7 See McGrath ( 1984, 1990) for discussions on groups and how
time affects the content and flow of information.
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collates, evaluates, synthesizes, and communicates infor-
mation about the data to members of a decentralized
communication network,
Assumption 3. Knowledge
Our third assumption is that knowledge is socially
produced and derived (see Hutchins, 199 1; Lave, 1988;
Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Lave, 1984). Knowledge about
data and how to avoid making errors is distributed and
distributed differentially across persons, activity, and set-
ting. Hutchins ( 1991, p. 306) observes that, “The tasks
of learning, remembering, and transmitting cultural
knowledge are inevitably distributed. The performance
of cognitive tasks that exceed individual abilities is al-
ways shaped by a social organization of distributed cog-
nition.” He points out that, “AI] division of labor re-
quires some distributed cognition in order to coordinate
the activities of the participants” ( p. 284).8 How a group
operates will depend on the distribution of knowledge
among its members.9
Decisions about producing data—which represent
embedded knowledge within the institutional context—
are socially distributed across participants and through
time ( Mehan, 1984, p. 63). Decisions, Mehan notes, are
arrived at through many small actions, “distributed
across many different levels of an organization [and] are
the consequence of routine, standardized procedures”
(p. 65). March ( 1991, p. 73) echoes Mehan, “Organiza-
tions store knowledge in their procedures, norms, rules,
and forms. They accumulate such knowledge over time,
learning from their members.” This knowledge is stored
in the heads of the organization’s members, whose career
trajectories may change and who may depart. The orga-
nizational memory is therefore vulnerable. Conse-
quently, knowledge must somehow be retained, perma-
nently stored, and capable of being retrieved, in order for
it to be transmitted to new members (Simon, 1991 ).
Another aspect of the social distribution of knowledge
is the relationship between the novice and expert.
Knowledge is acquired by the novice from an expert, in-
side the data producing organization, in the classroom or
in work situations, informally and formally, through
8 Hutchins classifies the types of cognition needed: To perform the
task (individual level ) and to coordinate the activities of the task (group
level ),
9 Hutchins ( 1991, pp. 284-285) cites Roberts ( 1964), an anthro-
pologist whose investigations of four American Indian tribes led him to
speculate about differences in “retrieval efficiency from cultural mem-
ory.” “Roberts attributed differences in retrieval efficiency at the group
level to variables such as group size, the pattern of interactions among
individuals. the distribution of knowledge, and the time course of in-
teraction” (p. 285 ). Hutchins suggests that “differences in the cognitive
accomplishments of any two groups might depend entirely on differ-
ences in the social organization of distributed cognition and not at all
on differences in the cognitive properties of individuals in the two
groups” (p. 285).
tacit and explicit forms of observation, instruction,
guided participation, and experimentation. There is,
however, significant variability in the way novices and
experts represent, search, and retrieve information, and
in their modes of and success in problem solving
( Bateson, Alexander, & Murphy, 1987; Carlson, 1990;
Chase & Simon, 1973; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, &
Simon, 1990; Payne, 1980 Reif, 1980; Saracevic & Kan-
tor 1988a, 1988b; Simon&Simon, 1978). Nevertheless,
the relationship between novice and expert requires a
partnership of “common language and system of ideas”
and the “granting of reciprocity y [and ]. . . a consider-
ation of alternative perspectives” ( Rogoff, 1990, pp.
148-49 ).
The metaphor of scaffolding is used to describe how
the individual acquires skills during the learning process.
Greenfield ( 1984, p. 118) explains that this metaphor is
a theoretical model of the ideal role of the teacher
(expert), who “intervenes selectively, structuring an in-
teraction by building on what he or she knows the learner
can do.” Expert guidance provides the institutional or
cultural memory, transmitting the relevant contextual
knowledge and cognitive skills required for the task
( Hutchins, 1990; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Gardner, 1984;
Seifert & Hutchins, 1989, 1992). Errors made by the in-
dividual become a signal to the expert to modify the sup-
port structure of the scaffold ( Greenfield, 1984, p. 136 ).
Seifert and Hutchins ( 1989, 1992) point out that
there is a career trajectory related to individuals who are
part ofa collaborative work group. Less skilled individu-
als gain access to and acquire information, becoming
more skilled in the process. Based on their study of how
novice sailors in the U.S. Navy learn how to navigate,
they suggest, “As a consequence of this alignment of ca-
reer trajectory with the path of information through the
[task] system, if one has access to an error, one also has
knowledge of the processes that may have generated it,
because one has already—at an earlier career stage-per-
formed all those operations” (p. 44).
Peer interaction also contributes to cognitive develop-
ment. Rogoff ( 1990, p. ix) notes that while peers may
be less skilled, they “may offer unique possibilities for
discussion and collaboration.” Their unique contrib-
utions include “motivation, imagination, and opportuni-
ties for creative elaboration of the activities of their com-
munity.” Rogoff also points out that those peers who are
relatively more skilled find effective ways to “achieve
shared thinking that stretches the less skilled partner’s
understanding” (p. 39).
But no matter whether the member of a data produc-
ing organization or researcher is a novice or expert,
avoiding errors made with complex data requires the ac-
quisition of a significant amount of new information
which must be organized for successful problem solving.
New information will be searched and retrieved and un-
derstandings will be constructed from the perspective of
the individual’s existing knowledge store, beliefs, experi-
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ences, and self-perceptions using a set of heuristic rules
( Linn & Clancy, 1990; Newell& Simon, 1972; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974, 1982 ).’0 These heuristic rules in-
clude saliency (used to select information), availability y
(to recall information), representativenew (to classify
information ), and anchoring (to retrieve initial
judgments) ( Mehan, 1984, p. 61, citing Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1974; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Knowledge will
typically be acquired through a trial-and-error approach.
Cognitive psychologists who study “mental models”
or “mental maps” and problem solving by physics and
engineering students offer us insights into how informa-
tion and experiences are organized for problem solving
11 Mental models provide aand knowledge creation.
“schema” that simplifies learning and helps us interpret
a new situation ( Linn & Clancy, 1990; Senge, 1990 ). As
Norman ( 1988b, p. 71) explains, “The power of mental
models is that they let you figure out what would happen
in novel situations. Or, if you are actually doing the task
and there is a problem, they let you figure out what is
happening.” The memory task is tremendously simpli-
fied if there is a “sensible structure. . . that corresponds
to knowledge that we already have, so that new material
can be understood, interpreted, and integrated with pre-
viously acquired material” (p. 69).
Applied to this discussion about complex data, mem-
bers of organizations and researchers have knowledge
about data and how to avoid making errors. This knowl-
edge, acquired through a discovery/learning process that
lowe make note of the impoflant role that motivation plays in in-
formation acquisition and receptivity to applying new and different
strategies for problem solving. We assume for the purposes of this arti-
cle that researchers are highly motivated to use complex data, but there
is great variability in receptivity to adopting different strategies for
problem solving. See also Spitzberg’s ( 1987) discussion on the require-
ments for communication competence (see below, Part Two, on “com-
municative competence” ).
II Mental m~eis are the “mental representations that underlie ev-
eryday reasoning about the world (Garnham, 1987, p. 152). Gam-
ham notes, however, that there are two uses of “mental models.” It may
mean ( 1) what people really have in their heads and what guides their
use of things” (Norman, 1983b,p. 12), or(2) the form of the content.
Gamham explains that for cognitive psychologists like Norman and
others (e.g., Gentner&Gentner, 1983, and Larkin et al., 1980), mental
models are “structures in semantic memory that are used to interpret a
wide variety of events, part of the background knowledge we use to
understand what is happening around us” (p. 152). These researchers
study “what is represented in mental models.” Norman ( 1988b, p. 38)
elaborates “Our conceptual models of the way objects work, events
take place, or people behave, result from our tendency to form expla-
nations of things. These models are essential in helping us understand
our experiences,predict the outcomes of our actions, and handle unex-
pected occurrences. We base our models on whatever knowledge we
have, real or imaginary, naive or sophisticated.” In contrast, for Garn-
ham who studies language understanding, mental models are “struc-
tures created duringlhe comprehension of particular texts. . [and ]
held in episodic memory.” Garnham’s interest is “more on the form
[of representation ] and the way [mental models] are constructed and
manipulated, than. on their content.” Our use of mental models
conforms to the “what” rather than the “form .“
is collaborative in nature, can be incorporated in a dis-
tributed task system designed to reduce error. Although
Seifert and Hutchins ( 1989, p. 45) contend that the dis-
tribution of knowledge means that most errors will be
caught ensuring this for complex data means that knowl-
edge about error must be institutionalized and archived.
It must be recoverable and be able to be transmitted.
Four aspects of knowledge/learning must be accounted
fon Knowledge acquisition, information distribution,
information interpretation, and organizational memory
(Httber, 1991). The task system must also incorporate
opportunities for data producer and peer collaboration
in shared discovery. There must be an expert who pro-
vides the “scaffold” and collates, archives, and commu-
nicates their discoveries and the accumulated knowledge
of organizational units, groups, and individuals involved
in data production and use.
Patt Two. Concepts and Definitions
This section provides definitions for two core con-
cepts, error and social cognition. Five types of error are
identified: Inferential error, residual or model error, de-
cision making error, methods error, and task perfor-
mance error. Social cognition means the relationship be-
tween cognitive development and social interaction.
The definition and everyday use of the term error is to
a large extent contextually dependent. The concept of
error means different things to different people in differ-
ent situations. Most scientists define the concept of error
in fairly rigorous terms, and much attention has been
devoted to developing procedures to understand and
minimize the occurrence of statistical error ( e.g., Cohen,
1988 ). The ways in which the concept of error is used
have not, however, been the focus of much attention by
the scientific community. Few resources have been de-
voted to identifying the types and sources of other errors
that may impact on statistical error. Groves ( 1989) ac-
knowledges that observational and nonobservational er-
rors do not represent all sources of error in survey data. 12
He writes,
The most notable omissions are those arising atler the
answers to the survey questions have been obtained by
the interviewers-the coding, editing, imputation, and
other data processing activities that follow the data col-
lection phase. . . These result from actions of proces-
sors and analysts of the data (p. 12).
12Groves ( 1989) Classifiesthe types of error in 5urveYdesign m o~
servational and nonobservational error. Observational error includes
interviewer, instrument, respondent, and mode of data collection.
Nonobservational error includes coverage, nonresponse, and sampling.
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These other types of error are more pervasive, less un-
derstood, and more elusive to define than the statisti-
cally-based concept of error. More importantly, how-
ever, experience suggests that these less well understood
errors impact on the extent and type of statistical error
that remains hidden within the residual error term of
models developed by users working with secondary data
sources. This is unfortunate, because the preoccupation
of the scientific community with the statistically-based
concept of error draws attention and resources away
from these other possible sources of error that occur in
the processing of data for subsequent use in secondary
analysis.
There are at least three other types of error which are
related to the production and utilization of data sources.
We begin the discussion by quickly reviewing the statis-
tically-based concept of error (inferential, residual, or
model ). This is then followed by a discussion of three
other types of error and their likely impacts upon statis-
tical erroc Task performance error. decision error, and
methods error. Examples drawn from the Survey oj_ln-
come and Program Participation ( SIPP) and the Wi.~-
consin Child Support Reform Program are used to illus-
trate each type of error, how and when such errors occur,
and the way in which each error impacts upon the statis-
tically based concept of error.
1. Iq/erential error. In “classical” statistics, error is
an incorrect judgment or inference based upon an ob-
tained statistical result conditioned on the assumption
that the null hypothesis is true. An error occurs when the
obtained statistical result produces one of two, mutually
exclusive, but incorrect decisions. In the first case, the
obtained statistical result leads to the incorrect rejection
of the null hypothesis when, “in reality,” the conditions
prescribed by the null hypothesis are true and we have
simply obtained a rare or extreme result. Put another
way, this is the decision that an effect does exist when, in
reality, it does not. This situation involves the familiar
Type 1 error in classical hypothesis testing designated by
alpha (a).
A Type I error could occur with the Wisconsin Child
Support Reform Program data when attempting to esti-
mate the confidence interval for the average annual net
child support amount received by custodial parents. The
chance of a Type I error can increase if sampling proce-
dures do not take into account important differences in
income sources and eligibility status for custodial parents
receiving child welfare benefits and those not eligible to
receive such supplements. An adequate sample design
must take into account that someone’s eligibility status
may change over time. For example, many custodial par-
ents who are eligible to receive child welfare benefits at
the time child support is awarded by the court may be-
come ineligible to receive welfare benefits when child
support payments are received in subsequent months.
Given the administrative rules associated with child wel-
fare benefits in most U.S. states, the actual net amount
of benefits received by the custodial parent family may
be less than the amount reported on court records at the
time the child support award is established. The converse
also holds true for custodial parents not eligible to receive
welfare benefits at the time of the court ordered child
support award. If child support payments are not re-
ceived in subsequent months, previously ineligible cus-
todial parents may become eligible for child welfare ben-
efits. Both cases would significantly affect estimates of
the average annual net child support amount received
within and between these two groups. Much of the prob-
lem can be traced to the unstable and dynamic nature of
income flow among poor and working class households
usually headed by one female custodial parent. Using ad-
ministrative records that represent income and child
support for a single point in time falsely portrays income
as a stable quantity when it is not. Therefore, the stan-
dard errors for average income comparisons between
custodial parents who are eligible for child welfare bene-
fits versus those who are not, would be much smaller
than would otherwise be expected.
The second type of inferential error occurs when the
statistical result obtained leads to the incorrect decision
to “not reject” the null hypothesis when, “in reality,” the
conditions prescribed by the null hypothesis are not true.
More simply stated, this is the decision that “no effect
exists” when, in reality, “the effect” does exist. This is the
less-often-considered Type II error.
An example ofa Type II error might include calculat-
ing the distribution of differences between the “total
amount of pay earned last month” in the SIPP and ear-
nings reported 12 months earlier. David ( 1991, pp. 96-
97) explains that the analyst is unlikely to calculate the
correct value because the procedures for collecting and
processing these data are not apparent. Some procedures
alter the data, such as imputation of missing data; some
procedures affect the sample of information obtained,
such as weighting of the data; and other procedures cre-
ate unresolvable ambiguities, such as use of hi-weekly
pay periods to estimate income. The general effect of
these procedures is that the mean is biased toward the
sub-sample of valid ( non-missing) responses. Biases are
introduced both by imputing data for item non responses
and for entire records where data are missing (using a
procedure called statistical matching ). The bias is more
pronounced for specific subsamples, such as low-income
people, who experience greater attrition in the panel.
Furthermore, the effect of statistical matching on the
sample of low-income persons ( or households) is to bias
monthly income upward because the data values are ob-
tained from individuals who have a similar demographic
profile, but represent a different (i.e., more stable) earn-
ings structure than those households for which income
data are missing. Therefore, annualized comparisons of
changes to income among low-income households, in
particular, would tend to show a higher degree of stabilit y
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than actually exists in reality. The mean tends to be up-
wardly biased and does not reflect true changes or insta-
bility due to statistical matching. The variance would
tend to be small due to a small mean and to limits on the
coding of income to avoid violating records confidenti-
ality of specific “high income” individuals. Therefore,
changes in annual income of low-income households
would tend to reflect an upwardly biased mean with
small variance and little change. In effect, the null hy-
pothesis of no change in income would not be rejected
when in reality substantial instability and change in in-
come may exist (i.e., a Type 11error).
2. Residual or modei error. Statistics provides an-
other concept of error related to multivariate model
building. Here, error is viewed as the residual variation
in the expected versus observed “scores” on one or more
dependent or response variables under a specific statisti-
cal model that incorporates one or more independent or
explanatory variables. This concept of error “as a resid-
ual” highlights possibly important sources of variation
which the independent or explanatory variables in a sta-
tistical model cannot explain.
For example, there are many different variables that
reflect different sources of variation, which may or may
not be incorporated into a statistical model. Some of
these include unmeasured changes in social program
benefit eligibility rules and criteria, household composi-
tion affecting program eligibility or benefit levels, or
statewide administrative decisions regarding eligibility of
specific groups of households. in addition, the baseline
criteria for determining eligibility can vary across social
programs and often does not correspond to an intact
household. Differences in everyday interpretations made
by hundreds of agency staff regarding what particular
data fields represent and under what conditions the data
are or are not recorded increase the probability that a
substantial amount of “noise” exists in the data. The im-
plications for producing large but irreducible unex-
plained variation under any statistical model are signifi-
cant.
3. Task performance error. In the field of work mea-
surement an error is sometimes defined, if only implic-
itly, as a mistake made while performing some task
which produces some unwanted or undesirable outcome
or consequence (cf., Siefert & Hutchins, 1989, 1992).
Applied to the design and management of survey re-
search, this conceptualization of error is closely related
to Groves’ ( 1989) view that errors can be expected to
occur during the processing of survey data or administra-
tive records.
For example, the Wisconsin Child Support Reform
Program obtained income data from the Wisconsin De-
partment of Revenue ( DOR ) data files of annual income
tax returns. These data were used both to supply missing
income data in the court records that constitute the core
of the data collection for information on divorces, sepa-
rations, and paternity cases, and to examine the effects
of one of these interventions in the experiment. Begin-
ning in 1986, taxpayers could file as either single, mar-
ried and separate, or married and joint. DOR organized
the data file so that only one record was generated for a
couple, and that record was filed under the name and
social security number ( SSN ) of the first person appear-
ing on the retum.13 The project staff supplied a list of
SSN for whom a SSN was available through the court
records. The program written by DOR conducted
searches that keyed off the primary taxpayer’s SSN field
only, and not that of the taxpayer’s spouse. One conse-
quence of the programmer’s error was that complete in-
dividual and household income for instances of remar-
riage in divorce cases and marriage in paternity cases
could not be obtained.
Similarly, court records on marriage, separation, and
divorce supply vital information about the employment
history of the parents. The data collection instrument re-
cords the employer and dates of employment of the non-
custodial parent as the different events occur over time
(the time period between a motion to file for separation
and a divorce decree can be less than a year or consider-
ably longer). During this period, employment status and
location may change many times. However, the data col-
lection instrument records only one instance of employ-
ment status, without dating the time period for that par-
ticular instance. Consequently, an analyst is unable to
determine whether nonpayment of child support is due
to a change in employment status or for some other rea-
son (e.g., administrative failure or delays in recording
payment, due either to change in employer or transfer of
payment information to the county Clerk of Courts re-
cord keeping system).
4. Decision making error. In individual and group
decision making, an error is often viewed as an incorrect
selection of an alternative course of action from a set of
two or more alternatives. The error occurs when the se-
lected course of action proves to be vastly inferior to
other alternatives that were known or could have been
made readily available at the time of the decision ( Janis
&Mann, 1977; March &Simon, 1958; Wilensky, 1967).
Analogously, in survey research, this type of error might
be best represented by a poor choice of a research or sam-
pling design.
An example of a decision making error is illustrated
with the choice of a database management system
(DBMS) for processing longitudinal or cross-sectional
data files. This is a choice that many data producing or-
ganizations must face. For example, the Bureau of the
Census made the decision to utilize data processing sys-
‘3The description of this example is drawn direttly from McCall
( 1989), “DOR Data Documentation.” See also Phillips& Garlinkel
( 1992).
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terns designed for handling cross-sectional (one point in
time ) data to a whole new set of data production activi-
ties. These new data production activities involved lon-
gitudinal (multiple points in time) data for the SIPP
project. This decision had widespread effects on data
quality and timeliness of public use file releases
(National Research Council, 1993b). One consequence
was that longitudinal data files could not be prepared un-
til the entire panel was complete. Another consequence
was that there was no easy way to edit data retrospec-
tively or prospectively, even though the design of the sur-
vey required knowledge of whether the sample person
was in the panel after a current interview. Olsen et al.
( 1991, pp. 2-3) also note another aspect of data process-
ing decisions that had implications for SIPP data quality.
Missing data in an interview were imputed from records
of a similar respondent, but not from data for the missing
respondent from his adjacent interviews. They comment
that.
the current system can generate substantial instability for
a respondent’s history simply because missing data from
the middle of a series is supplied from a different person.
Users are oflen unaware of this problem since the im-
puted values are incorporated into the raw data and sig-
nalled with an imputation flag Because a primary
focus of the SIPP is transitions, the danger of using im-
puted variables in event histories [i.e., longitudinal data
on the occurrences of events] are especially great.
.5. A4elhuds error. Another concept of error in-
volves the mismatch between analytical methods avail-
able to or used by organizational decision makers and
their identification of the fundamental underlying struc-
ture of organizational problems (ranging from ill-struc-
tured to well-structured ). Under this view, different ana-
lytical methods may be applied to generate problem
statements or to produce solution alternatives that
match the “true” defining attributes (or structure ) of the
problem at hand. An error occurs when analytical meth-
ods are used that are not appropriately matched to the
problem at hand. In other words, the method selected is
not “analytically congruent” with the defining attributes
of the problem (Sutherland, 1978).
For example, the Census Bureau’s choice of tradi-
tional computer programming methods to produce data
from the SIPP longitudinal survey had repercussions for
the scientific design and usefulness of the SIPP survey
data. This survey was conceived as a tool for measuring
economic well-being and social program participation,
with a focus on short-term events. The instrument was
designed in part to respond quickly to new policy issues
on the political agenda. Thus, although the instrument
could be redesigned to incorporate new questions, the
decision to invest heavily in traditional programming so-
lutions meant that the data processing system could not
meet the research design requirements for greater flexi-
bility. In effect, the data processing system altered one of
the original goals of the scientific design of the survey in
a way that made the survey’s data less useful.
Social Cognition
The f6cus of attention is on the relationship between
cognitive development and social interaction (cf., Pia-
get, 1926; Vygotsky, 1932/ 1962). SociaI cognition refers
to the fact that “cognitive development is both an indi-
vidual and a social process” ( Butterworth & Light, 1982,
p. xiv). As Lave ( 1988, p. 1) explains, cognition is the
“nexus of relations between the mind at work and the
world in which it works.” Rogoff and Lave ( 1984, p. 4 )
argue that cognitive activity takes place “in interac-
tion with other people and use of socially provided tools
and schemas 14 for solving problems. Cognitive activity
is socially defined, interpreted, and supported. ” The
“context provides information and resources that facili-
tate the ‘appropriate solution of the problem at hand”
( Rogoff & Lave, 1984, p. 4). Roloff and Berger ( 1982,
p, 15) add that “In order to make sense of the complex
information inputs involved in interaction, people are
motivated to construct representations of reality.” Social
cognition is organized by means of scripts or conceptual
schema, frameworks created by people to make sense of
their environment and to communicate how they view
that environment ( Lave, 1988, p. 18),
One implication is that the study of cognition from
inside the head must be shifted to the whole person “in
action, acting with the settings of that activity” ( Lave,
1988, p. 17). A second implication is that cognitive ac-
tivities can no longer be assumed to be abstract and
context-free. 15 Furthermore, knowledge and skills can
not be easily transferred from one activity to another.
Indeed, empirical studies indicate that heuristic rules
upon which these generalizations are based often lead to
significant errors in judgment. This is because differently
organized learning experiences and tasks will yield
different experiences and require that people develop
different cognitive skills.
Cognition is socially distributed. Cicourel ( 1990, p.
223 ) writes that “The idea of socially distributed cogni-
tion refers to the fact that participants in collaborative
work relationships are likely to vary in the knowledge
they possess ( Cicourel, 1974; Schutz, 1964) and must
therefore engage each other in dialogues that allow them
to pool resources and negotiate their differences to ac-
complish their tasks.” Socially distributed cognition is
‘4Norman ( 1988a, p. 86) defines schemas as “knowledge structures
that contain the general rules and information neeessary for interpret-
ing situations and for guiding behavior.”
I$This ~cond implication strongty su~ests that we must rethink
and probably modify both our expectations about the transferability of
what students learn and the pedagogical methods that we apply in the
classroom.
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analogous to distributed computing ( Chandrasekaran,
198 1; Gomez & Chandrasekaran, 198 1; Smith & Davis,
198 1). Cicourel ( 1990, p. 223) explains that “In auto-
mated systems, distributed problem solving refers to the
cooperative solution of problems by a decentralized and
loosely coupled collection of knowledge sources located
in different processors.” Smith and Davis ( 1981, p. 61)
note that,
The KS’s [Knowledge Sources] cooperate in the sense
that no one of them has sufficient information to solve
the entire problem; mutual sharing of information is nec-
essary to allow the group as a whole to produce an an-
swer. By decentralized we mean that both control and
data are logically and often geographically distributed;
there is neither global control nor global data storage.
Loosely coupled means that individual KS’s spend the
great percentage of their time in computation rather than
communication.
This decentralization, due to decomposition of the com-
plexity of the tasks, provides considerably increased
efficiency because the subunits (Knowledge Sources ) op-
erate in parallel. ‘b A decentralized approach to the orga-
nization of problem solving reduces uncertain y. 17 Re-
source constraints are also reduced by the distributed
system because it is “highly modularized and offers con-
ceptual clarity and simplicity of design” (Smith & Davis,
1981, p.61).
Cooperation may come in many forms, but this arti-
cle concentrates on sharing of information, or, as Smith
and Davis ( 1981, p. 61 ) refer to it, “result-sharing,”
whereby, from time to time, “experts periodically report
to each other the partial results they have obtained dur-
ing the execution of individual tasks.” The principles of
feedback and control, leading to improving the quality
of data and modifying the scientific design of panel sur-
veys, for example, obviously require “task sharing,” as
well.
The form of a distributed system cannot be specified
in advance because it will depend on the complexity of
the task, level of uncertainty, and resource constraints.
Fox ( 1981, p. 70) notes that “The major problem with
designing distributed systems is deciding how the task
should be decomposed and the [type ofl control regime
to be used, and this choice of organization is determined
IScomplexity, as”~ in this context, derives from work by Herberr
Simon on “bounded rationality.” Complexity is defined as “exeessive
demands on rationality. That is, the task requirements exceed current
bounds on computational capacity” (Fox, 1981, p. 75). Our article
is concerned with three aspects of complexity: Information, task, and
communication.
I7“n~efiinty is &fjn~ as “the difference between information
available and the information necessary to make the best decision”
(Fox, 1981, p. 75). Fox adds three additional manifestations of uncer-
tainty: Correctness of the information, knowledge lacking about possi-
ble outcomes of the decision, prediction of future states, and behavioral
uncertain y.
by features of the task (domain) and some measurement
criteria [transaction analysis] .“ The laboratory and field
research on communication networks suggest how to op-
timize communications among nodes. Design strategies
in Part Three incorporate the results of these studies.
Summarizing the Argument: Core Concepts and
Relationships, and Propositions Linking
Communications, Social Knowledge and Error
Figure 1 depicts the key flows and relationships that
affect the data production, data utilization, and error
production. Errors are embedded in the data production
and utilization, which are eventually realized by data
producers and users operating as experts, novices, or
technological gatekeepers. Social and individual cogni-
tion facilitates the development of contextually-depen-
dent conceptualizations, in the form of cognitive con-
structs and categories of meaning at the collective or
group and individual levels. The realization of error in
data production and utilization affects these cognitive
processes in two ways: 1) Through individual and social
communications, and 2 ) through the interplay of cogni-
tive and communicative competencies operating within
and between the individual and collective or group
levels.
The lower half of Figure 1 reflects processes that oper-
ate at the individual level of cognition and communica-
tions. These include, as shown by the inner ring, shorter
term, more episodic, and situationally-specific commu-
nications, Ianguaging acts, and performance of tasks in
which individual cognition operates as a mediating fac-
tor. The outer ring represents the accumulation of indi-
vidual knowledge, experiences, and skills. Such accumu-
lations define a contextual envelope in which individual
understandings about data production and use develops
through individual learning.
The upper half of Figure 1 describes processes that op-
erate at the social or collective level of cognition and com-
munications. This includes, as shown by the inner ring,
shorter term, more episodic, and situationally-specific
communications, functioning, and performance by col-
lectives or groups. It focuses attention on social and tech-
nical issues in data production and utilization where so-
cial cognition serves as a mediating factor. The outer ring
concerns the accumulation of socially and technically
relevant knowledge, experiences, and skills by collectives
or groups. Such accumulations define a contextual enve-
lope for collective or group understandings about the
data production and data utilization processes where or-
ganizational and situational contexts affect and are
affected by social learning.
Three Propositions
Table 1 displays the propositions. The first assump-
tion (A 1) is that error in the production and use of data
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FIG. 1. Key flows andrelationships affecting data production, data utilization, andemor prductionpr~esws
is inevitable. Much of how people know and what people
know involves learning on the job under conditions of
substantial ambiguity, persistent uncertainty, and sig-
nificant inconsistencies, gaps, and idiosyncratic quirks in
their knowledge and understanding over what to do next
with the data at hand. Trial and error learning is the
usual way, and not the exceptional circumstance, that
people utilize to develop an understanding about data
and how they can be or are used.
The first proposition follows from this first assump-
tion.
(P1.1)
(PI.2)
(PI.3)
(P1.4)
(cl.])
The greater the degree of ambiguity and uncer-
tainty in social and situational contexts for
which data are needed, desired or required;
The greater the likelihood that inconsistencies,
gaps and quirks exist in the distribution of
knowledge and understandings about data, its
production and use;
The greater the extent to which trial and error
learning dominates the production and use of
data;
The greater the extent to which errors occurring
in the production and use of data will be socially
produced (rather than generated solely by indi-
vidual mistakes in judgment);
Therefore, the greater the probability that errors
—
—
will remain undetected in the production and
use of data.
The second assumption ( A2 ) is that data produc-
tion and use involve communication processes that
take place in a variety of social and organizational set-
tings and through processes of individual and social
cognition. Language serves a central function in com-
municating ideas and information about data, espe-
cially complex data. Language itself introduces varia-
tion in interpretive schemas and in communication of
those schemas. Data represent a conversion of lan-
guage forms from discourse to some type of symbolic
representation (text, numbers, pictures/displays).
The conversion process, however, introduces varia-
tion in the representation, meaning, and value at-
tached to data.
A variety of communication network structures are
possible to communicate information about data.
Some network forms are more effective and eficient,
and produce greater participant satisfaction than oth-
ers, depending on the nature of the communication
task regarding data production and data use. The oc-
currence of error in data depends upon the phenome-
nology of language, the interpretive processes associ-
ated with languaging as an act, the distribution of so-
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TABLE 1. Assumptions, propositions, and conclusions,
I PROPOSITION SET #l I
Assumption 1: The occurrenw of errors is inevitable in the production and use of data.
Repositions Conchlsioos
P1.1 The greater the degree of ambiguity and C1.1 The greater the probability that errors will remain
uncertainty in social and situational contexts for undetected in the preduetion and use of data.
which data are needed, desired, or required
P1.2 The greater the likelihood that inconsistencies,
gaps, and quirks exist in the distribution of
knowledge and understandings about data
P1.3 The greater the extent to which trial and error
learning dominates the production and use of data
P1.4 The grater the extent to which errors are socially
produc%d
I PROPOSITION S= W I
ksurnption 2: Data production and use involve communicaticxt pmxsses thattake place inavariety ofsocial and
organizational settings and through processes of individual and social cognition.
Repositions Conclllsiom
P2. 1 The greater the complexity of social and organi- C2.1 The greater the pbability that errors will signifi-
z.ational communication structures and processes Cantlyimpact onandremairt rmdetecte!din the
pmduetion artd use of data.
P2.2 The greater the cognitive load and &gree of
cognitive complexity experienced by data
produeexs and users
P2.3 The greater the likelihood that eomrnunicatiorr
network failures and breakdowns occur
PROPOSITION SEP #3
I
Assumption 3: Knowledge is socially preduced and derived fmrn experimces with eveats situatims, aetivib
objeets, people, and use of data tit deseribe these elements
Mpositiom conclusions
P3. 1 The greater the extent of variability in the dstri- C3.1 ‘t%egreater the probability thst errors will remain
bution of knowledge about data production and undetected in the preduetion and w of data.
uses between novices, experts, and technology
gatekeeper
P3.2 The meat to which deviations in the structure+
proce~ sad content of eomtnunications about
data production and uses remain ignored or are
out of alignmem betweem experts, novi~ and
technological gatekeqxxs.
cial cognition, and the dynamics of social interaction ( P2. 1) The greater the complexity of social and or-
in one or more social networks. ganizational communication structures and
The second proposition follows from this second as- processe~
sumption. (P2.2) The greater the cognitive load and degree ofcogni-
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(P2.
(C2.
)
)
tive complexity experienced by data producm and
usely
The greater the likelihood that communication
network failures and breakdowns occur;
Therefore, the greater the probability that errors
will significantly impact on and will remain un-
detected in the production and use of data.
The third assumption ( A3 ) is that knowledge is so-
cially produced and derived from experiences with
events, situations, activities, objects, people, and the use
of data that describe these elements. Discovery, diagno-
sis, correction, control, and prevention of error in data
depend upon the social distribution of knowledge, which
is created through relationships between experts, nov-
ices, and technological gatekeepers. Knowledge pro-
cesses (learning, remembering, and transmitting
information ) are unevenly distributed within any social
or organizational setting and lead to great variations in
individual and collective understandings about the pro-
duction and use of data. This occurs because knowledge
is produced in a variety of venues (e.g., work situations,
tacit and explicit observations, instructions, guided par-
ticipations, etc.). Once created, this knowledge is
transmitted over a variety of social and organizational
communication network structures. This means that de-
cisions about the production and use of data are socially
distributed across participants and through time. This
leads to cumulative or contradictory decisions on ways
of transferring knowledge from experts to novices. The
technological boundary spanner or gatekeeper can sup-
port this vital function by facilitating communication of
information about data, its production, and its uses be-
tween experts and novices.
The third proposition then is that:
(P3.1)
(P3.2)
(C3. I )
The greater the extent of vanabilit y in the distr-
ibution of knowledge about data production and
uses between novices, experts, and technological
gatekeepers;
The greater the extent to which deviations in the
structures, processes, and the content of commu-
nications about data production and uses re-
main ignored or are “out of alignment” between
experts, novices, and technological gatekeeper,
Therefore, the greater the probability that errors
will remain undetected in the production and
USEof data.
Part Three. Designing for Error: User-Centered
Design
Production of error results from communication fail-
ures. Knowledge, information, and data regarding what
is known about complex data are not communicated
from one individual to another, between groups, or or-
ganizations and organizational subunits. Developing a
distributed task system of social cognition requires
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effective communication. There are differences in the ex-
tent of knowledge and the nature of assumptions about
what is known about the data by whom. A distributed
task system for producing and using complex data must
be designed to transfer information, reduce knowledge
differences, communicate background assumptions un-
derlying the data, and create a permanent repository of
knowledge, experience, and skills.
According to Norman ( 1988b, p. 131 ), if a user
makes an error, there is probably a good reason for it. If
an analyst makes a mistake, it was probably because the
information was unavailable or misleading. If the analyst
did one thing, but intended to do another (a “slip”), it is
probably due to a fault in the design of the task or infor-
mation production system. Although it is not possible
to design systems so that users make no errors, systems
should be designed to: I ) Understand the causes of error
and design to minimize those causes (see also Lewis &
Norman, 1986 ); 2 ) make it possible to reverse actions—
to “undo” them—or make it harder to do what cannot
be reversed; 3) make it easier to discover the errors that
do occur, and make them easier to correct; 4) change
the attitude of those who work with data toward learning
from errors rather than punishing them when errors
occur; and, 5 ) reconceptualize the management of error
in terms of opportunities to learn rather than situations
of demonstrated incompetence.
Improvements must be made in conceptualizations of
how people work with data: To view those people who
produce and utilize data as people who perform tasks
that generate some desired result from a series of imper-
fect approximations. People who work with data should
not be viewed as people who either avoid or commit er-
rors. Instead, their actions must be understood as a series
of approximations toward a desired result.
To meet these design goals, information systems must
function to support, in fundamental ways, the develop
ment of two interdependent competencies. Both comm-
unicative competence and cognitive competence must
be developed to produce and utilize complex data. Sev-
eral key strategies and principles are presented below that
will move toward systems designs and operations which
support these two competencies.
Designing for Communicative Competence
These strategies have been strongly influenced by the-
orists who view the design of information systems as
“tools for conversation.” Conversation takes place in a
social setting. Conversation is necessary to avoid break-
downs which are always on the verge of occurring, al-
though, as Winograd and Flores ( 1987, p. 158) note, “It
is impossible to completely avoid breakdowns by design,
since it is in the nature of any design process that it must
select a finite set of anticipations from the situation.”
However, developers can “partially anticipate situations
where breakdowns are likely to occur (by noting their
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recurrence ) and provide people with the tools and pro-
cedures they need to cope with them.”
According to Winograd and Flores ( 1987, p. 162),
communicative competence “means the capacity to ex-
press one’s intentions and take responsibilities in the net-
works of commitments that utterances and their inter-
pretations bring to the world.” Communicative compe-
tence requires that systems developed include some
capability to learn about the “fundamental relationships
between language and successful action.” Therefore, sys-
tems must be designed to focus on the use of language to
characterize data. This requires a different view of lan-
guage that extends beyond simply description. Systems
must be designed to recognize that language is a form of
action which creates commitments, in the form of prom-
ises and intentions to perform some action in the future.
According to this view, language serves as the generative
force in creating and changing our understanding about
the social contexts in which we operate on an everyday
basis.
To improve communicative competence in the do-
main of data production systems, opportunities for on-
line, real-time learning through collective social interac-
tion must be developed. This, of course, argues for a
different approach to education than simply the formal
classroom experience. Designers must seek to develop
online learning systems that facilitate deeper and wider
understanding of the linkages between everyday lan-
guage and successful practical action involving large
scale, complex data production systems. This “practi-
cal” perspective argues for communication systems that
can reveal and make explicit those meanings and inter-
pretations about the contents and procedures associated
with the production and utilization of data. Such im-
provements are essential for large-scale, complex data
systems because these meanings, once established, are
rarely questioned.
Yet it is these implicit everyday understandings and
interpretations about what the data mean and how they
are and can be used that serve as the basis for break-
downs. Such breakdowns are represented by slips, mis-
takes, and miscommunication about the meaning of
data which are revealed at various points in the data pro-
duction and utilization life cycle. Such breakdowns rep-
resent opportunities for learning about data and for im-
proving the quality of data, and for enhancing data pro-
duction and data utilization systems. Rather than avoid
error it must be embraced, especially, when it is realized
through breakdowns in data production and use. Em-
bracing error in this fashion allows greater control to be
exercised when error does occur but would otherwise re-
main concealed (which is, of course, the worst error of all ).
1. Create a permanent repository of conversations
about error. Much of what is known about data is nei-
ther documented or communicated. It is permanently
lost. An expanded view of information systems requires
an integrated conceptualization about data, its produc-
tion, and its use. Such designs incorporate expertise and
knowledge of multiple data producers and users and take
advantage of social interactions that area natural part of
most work. A distributed system of social cognition must
create and communicate an audit trail of conversations
about what is known, understood, and assumed about
complex data. Such an information system must also in-
clude a variety of analytical functions to siil through the
conversations and, eventually, develop a “global view”
of knowledge about a particular set of complex data.
Because the database designer “designs the language
that creates the world in which the user operates”
( Winograd & Flores, 1987, p. 165), it is essential that
database designs include the particular background as-
sumptions, presuppositions, and cultural values of the
designer, producer, and user. The cultural biases of de-
signers, producers, and users must be brought to the at-
tention of each participant in the entire system of data
production and use. This requires information systems
designs capable of creating a self-documenting history or
system “autobiography” of data production and use. A
system “autobiography” (i.e., documentation of formal
policies, procedures and rules for producing and using
data) would also track the network of interactions be-
tween producers and users. This type of design forces
both data producer and user to communicate and ex-
change information about their operative, and often in-
formal, policies and practices. Put simply, knowledge
held by data producers and users must be communi-
cated, transferred, and shared on a continuing basis if
they are to develop information systems capable of lear-
ningabout and controlling error.
2. Prototype the data production and data utilization
process. Prototyping maximizes opportunities for
learning about information system specifications (e.g.,
system needs, requirements, and uses ) when prevailing
conditions can be characterized by a high degree ofcom-
plexity, a significant amount of irreducible uncertainty,
and a lack of identifiable structure to guide system devel-
opment efforts (Davis & Olson, 1985, pp. 566-568). A
prototyping approach encourages the development of
information system specifications through a process of
iterative design and experimentation with limited
“models” of input, processing, and output functions that
the system is expected to perform (Davis&Olson, 1985,
pp. 566–568 ). This design strategy relies on the active
participation of end-users to provide knowledge and ex-
perience as an aid in determining system specifications.
It offers an opportunity for the system designer to learn
about an end-user’s mental model of how tasks will be
performed and the conditions under which end-users
can and will transform data into something “of value”
(i.e., information). It requires that end-users actively
participate in developing and reacting to design changes.
Prototyping allows end-users to learn how the system
114 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE—February 1997
can satisfy their information needs while helping them
to perform required tasks. Because prototyping relies on
an iterative process of analysis, design, and implementa-
tion, it is more efficient than traditional approaches, en-
abling designers to construct less costly, but highly lim-
ited, systems to see how users will or will not use it ( Boar,
1986 ). It also enables changes to occur in the informa-
tion system specifications or designs before commit-
ments become irrevocable ( Rubin, 1986 ).
Most importantly, the prototyping strategy facilitates
dialogue between information system users and system
designers and allows the designers to modify quickly
specifications in light of new information and learning
( Martin, 1982). Gould and colleagues ( 1991, p. 75)
contend that evidence exists to confirm that the user fo-
cus creates a “usability design process [that] leads to sys-
tems, applications, and products that are easy to learn,
contain the right functions, are well liked, and safe.” Ev-
idence from other studies also indicates that participa-
tion in system design efforts increases user “literacy” and
satisfaction with the system ( Baronas & Reis, 1988; Bar-
oudi, Olson, & Ives, 1986; Hirschheim, 1985; Montez-
emi, 1988; Norman, 1988a, 1988b). Prototyping is most
useful when it supports an active learning process about
the system needs, requirements, and uses.
Prototyping can be employed to model data collec-
tion, processing, and utilization efforts when the system
is first being created or any time a major policy or proce-
dural change occurs. This form of prototyping models
the heuristic rules and actions taken by those people in-
volved at key points in the data production and utiliza-
tion process. When linked with the communication
strategy cited above (Recommendation # 1), prototyp-
ing provides an early warning of those data production
and utilization activities that are likely to cause the oc-
currence of one or more errors. Early detection of error
is important since, as noted by Lewis and Norman
( 1986. p. 419), early detection is “the first step toward
recovery” and toward proper system functioning, as
well.
3. Crea~c a communication network for shared con-
versations, Underlying a cooperative task system is “a
central assumption . . . that the knowledge sources
must cooperate to solve a problem because no one source
has enough information to do the job” (Cicourel, 1990,
p. 223). Successful communicative acts depend on
shared knowledge. “Communication with human be-
ings,” writes Mark ( 1986, p. 219), “requires shared un-
derstanding of the way the world works.”
Management of complex data is not only managing
data, but also about managing the coordination of infor-
mation needs and knowledge about the data. A common
framework for coordinating information is necessary if
analysts are to “accomplish a cognitive performance”
( Rogoff & Gardner, 1984, p. 97 ). This common frame-
work for coordinating information must be established
by the information system designer working in concert
with data producers and users. Structuring dialogues and
conversation about complex data requires the creation
of formal roles to coordinate the flow of information and
communications about complex data. This role is de-
fined here as the “information gatekeeper.”
Communication/information systems need to be de-
signed to make information both easily available and ac-
cessible ( Culnan, 1985 ). Information needs to be orga-
nized for ease of extraction and available when needed. 1g
Both criteria need to be addressed not only when
designing for communicative competence, but also
when designing for cognitive competence.
Designing for Cognitive Competence
Two strategies for designing for cognitive competence
are emphasized: Achieve an understanding of the data
and create a learning environment for the detection and
correction of error.
1. Provide a good menial model of the data. Nor-
man ( 1988b, p. 70) writes that “Good mental models
help people derive appropriate behavior for situations
that are not remembered or never before encountered.”
A good mental model makes it easier for people to learn
and interpret information, and, consequently, detect er-
ror. Brown ( 1986, p. 466) writes about mental models as
related to computer systems, but his comments are also
relevant to the representation of complex data:
Mental models of how the system functions relative to
both its constituent parts and a given task provide the
most stable and robust basis for understanding. Such
mcdels are also a crucial resource for facilitating infor-
mal discovery, learning through a sort of task-oriented
empiricism, as they [users] form a cognitive structure
about which hypotheses can be formed and tested.
A robust understanding of the data and how they are or-
ganized means that users will have a greater sense of con-
trol over the system, and this will lead to improvements
in detecting and recovering from error.
Conceptual models of the data, especially competing
conceptual models, must be made more explicit. Nor-
man ( 1986) suggests that conceptual models provide a
scaffolding upon which to build bridges across what he
calls “the gulf between execution and evaluation.” The
scientific design and procedures constitute the concep-
tual model of the data. This would allow inference from
‘8Tulving and Pearlstone ( 1966) and Fischhoff et al. ( 1987) distin-
guish between the concepts of availability and accessibility, and suggest
that the quality of an informational resource can be measured by these
two criteria (p. 33). The availability criterion refers to the “amount of
information that it [the resource] contains.” The accessibility criterion
refers to the “ease with which users extract information from it [the
resource ].“
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data that requires interpretation to be consistent with the
design and procedures used to execute the design.
The conceptual model of the data means that data
must have an explicit logical structure in order to reduce
cognitive complexity and ambiguity (see David, 199 1;
David & Robbin, 1990a). This requires that objects,
properties, contexts, and relationships must be explicitly
defined and systematically organized, so that people can
work effectively and make inferences about the next
steps to take in problem-solving ( Reichman, 1986, p.
310). For complex data, this implies that the entities and
the relationships must be clearly displayed by semantic
principles that organize each part of a database. In this
regard three aspects must be considered: 1) The object to
which an item in an instrument refers ( referent ); 2) the
bounding reference period; and 3) the attribute that is
being elicited. The aggregation of entities must be clearly
identified, and the aggregation of measures over several
entities and the attribution of aggregates to those entities
must be clearly described. Repeated measures must be
identified and unambiguously labeled. Measures taken
at different points in time that are not identical must be
clearly identified to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty
about what the data and data interrelationships really
represent. Precise relationships describing their similar-
ities can then be constructed. Finally, the timing and
length of events must be clearly identified, including in-
tervals in which respondents provide or fail to provide
adequate responses.
2. Create a supported iearning environment to en-
courage the self-detec~ion of error. Although consider-
able prior knowledge is required to use complex data
effectively, formal instruction can rarely, if ever, provide
all the skills needed. Knowledge of how to use a data set
appropriately is usually acquired “on the job” during ac-
tual use. As such, errors will always occur during a train-
ing period while users familiarize themselves with the
data. Furthermore, knowledge of the data will be differ-
entially distributed among experts and novices accord-
ing to their career trajectories, experiences, knowledge,
and acquired skills.
Siefert and Hutchins ( 1992, p. 17) have observed that
four elements provide an opportunity to detect erron Ac-
cess, knowledge and expectation, attention, and perspec-
tive. Access means the “ability to observe errors being
made.” Knowledge and expectation concern the “ability
to judge that the processor product will produce error.”
Attention relates to the “monitoring of activity.” Differ-
ences in perspective pertain to “noting of discrepancies
from a different point of view.” These elements have im-
plications for the organization of learning opportunities
and the role of expert as a teaching coach (i.e., a
transmitter of knowledge, skills, and values or culture ) in
a distributed system of social cognition. These strategies
emphasize information systems as a learning environ-
ment, cognition as a generative process, and the interde-
pendency of relations between, and active involvement
of, experts and novices.
Analysts are limited by how much information they
can retrieve and evaluate. Because there are severe limi-
tations on memory and attention, systems must be de-
signed to reduce the number and structure of tasks that
the user is required to perform on the data. It is therefore
essential to simplify what must be remembered. Norman
( 1988b) has a number of suggestions that are relevant
for reducing the cognitive complexity of tasks associated
with longitudinal panel studies. He first suggests the need
to minimize planning or problem solving on the part of
the user while maximizing experimentation and feed-
back. This implies, for example, the use of a sample da-
tabase that lowers the high costs of learning through
quick retrieval of results and the development of ad hoc
queries. Norman’s second suggestion is to modularize
tasks, so that each module has limited properties and
limited features. By modularizing what must be analyzed
by the user, the system designer reduces the amount of
data needed to be understood at any one time. The effect
of modularizing is to make it easier to discover errors
that do occur and easier to correct them. Making the en-
tity-attribute relationships more visible, for example,
will “help the user identify problems” with the data,
[and] it can also help tbe system identify how it can help
the user” (OMalley, 1986, p. 388 ). Norman’s third sug-
gestion is to allow only those features of the data that
are absolutely necessary. This implies, for example, that
database designers make available the measurements as
recorded by the instrument and minimize the number of
“constructed” variables. This approach, in effect, en-
courages “filtering” to reduce memory load. The fourth
suggestion made by Norman is to provide mental aids
that form a knowledge base. Lewis ( 1986, p. 183) sug-
gests that certain mental aids should be designed to assist
information selection because users “often make errors
by assuming that actually irrelevant information is re-
lated to their concerns of the moment.”
At least three applications derive from Lewis’s sugges-
tion. Fh’st, metadata should be developed to make the
background assumptions and contexts of the data ex-
plicit, explicate the meaning of the data, “form principles
on which to build understanding” ( Mark, 1986, p. 220 ),
show alternative courses of action, and help users evalu-
ate the effects of their actions. Systems should be de-
signed with extended browsing capabilities that familiar-
ize users with the categories and underlying conceptual
structure of both the information system and the data-
base ( Cleal, 1988, p. 230; Fkchhoff, MacGregor, &
Blackshaw, 1987). Help systems should be employed be-
cause they can extend the user’s memory (David & Rob-
bin, 1992; Norman &Draper, 1986, p. 356; Owen, 1986)
and because they more closely resemble the distributed
model of information retrieval by which understanding
and learning actually takes place (diSessa, 1986).
The task system creates a supported learning situation
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whose objectives are to extend the analyst’s current skills
and knowledge to a higher level of competence, to build
new skills into the analyst’s existing knowledge structure
(Greenfield, 1984; Rogoff & Gardner, 1984), and to in-
crease the analyst’s sense of control over the data and
information system. Fundamental to ensuring success in
learning is the application of principles associated with
“scaffolded” learning environments. Through “guided
participation” an expert transfers information, guides
the transfer of knowledge skills from other problem solv-
ing contexts, and evaluates the actions of the novice. The
expert monitors the process that novices follow and as-
sesses their performance. Experts help novices move to-
ward independence by formulating questions that enable
novices to eventually discover answers on their own
( O’Malley, 1986 ). An expert plays an essential role in
structuring the novice’s interaction with data. Expert di-
agnosis of errors made by novices promotes error correc-
tion. As Seifert and Hutchins ( 1992, p. 23) note, “Be-
yond correcting an error that has occurred, a conse-
quence of having engaged in diagnosing the cause of an
error may be a new insight about the task processes.”
Feedback is provided through demonstration, instruc-
tion, and question-asking and -answering to “guide the
discovery of concepts underlying the solution” (Seifert
& Hutchins, 1992, p. 26).
Two principles are emphasized with this strategy: Ex-
ploration, which may occur through hypothesis-testing,
for example, and error-based learning, which may arise
by making mistakes, asking questions, seeking advice, or
searching for information. Both activities are earned out
through a dialogue between novice and expert. In other
words, as O’Malley ( 1986, pp. 397-398) argues, “It is
not enough to produce only the information alone—the
system should also support question discovery in order
to support the ‘whole user’ activity of information acqui-
sition—of users helping themselves” to be able to ask the
question in the first place ( see LaFrance, 1992; Graesser,
Person, & Huber, 1992).
Underlying the strategy of designing an information
system as a learning environment is the principle of a
cooperative task environment. People depend on each
other for information, advice, and problem solving. Im-
plied by this strategy is the design of an information sys-
tem that develops and relies on local experts and a sense
of communit y which is created when data producers and
users work together on the same data set (cf., Ban non,
1986 ). Participation creates a redundancy of knowledge
and experience as the number of experts increases. The
distribution of knowledge among novices and experts
ensures that most errors will be detected through the
multiple perspectives and communication among the
participants.
Concluding Remarks
A very large investment has been made in the produc-
tion and use of public data from administrative records
and longitudinal panel surveys, but subsequent use of
these complex data has been much smaller than antici-
pated. It is also important, however, to acknowledge that
conditions other than the design of appropriate informa-
tion systems and services precluded using large-scale,
complex datasets until very recently. These other condi-
tions include: I ) A significant intellectual and capital in-
vestment required because of the significant size, scope,
and complexity of large-scale datasets 2 ) the lack of low-
cost computer-based technologies for efficient and low-
cost data reorganization and retrieval, communication
of scientific information, and exchange of data; and, 3)
the recent emergence of a national information and so-
cial science infrastructure for conducting research and
public policy analysis which, nevertheless, was not de-
signed to respond quickly to a dynamic environment for
data production and utilization (David & Robbin,
1992 ). It should also be noted that the mental models
and prevailing paradigms which shape social science ac-
tivity—that provide frameworks guiding the cultural val-
ues and activities about the enterprise itself-remained
unchanged. By and large, the techniques and tools have
not been connected to the process of scientific discovery
and to improvements in theory, measurement, and data
quality (Hall, 1992 ). One consequence has been little if
any interest in applying advances in information tech-
nology to improve the quality of complex data and to
enhance the performance and results obtained from the
current social science infrastructure.
At the same time, however, developments in concepts
and methods in information systems designs have, for
the most part, proceeded without an adequate theoreti-
cal foundation. Technical systems continue to be built in
the United States without much attention to the social
systems in which they are embedded-this despite con-
tinuing acknowledgment and diagnosis of the funda-
mental problem. Collaboration bet ween sccial scientists,
information scientists, and computer scientists has been
minimal if nearly non-existent ( Robbin, 1995 ). And
this, in itself, may explain why many technological in-
novations in the social sciences have failed, and why the
current social science infrastructure in the United States
has not evolved in response to these new technologies.
This article makes the case that the quality of data
produced and used can be improved if the design of in-
formation systems rests on a theoretical foundation of
social science theory and practice. Attention has been
drawn to a large body of theory and research that can be
used to design information systems that help us discover,
understand, and control error which occurs through a
variety of interacting organizational, social, and cogni-
tive processes. A change in perspective in how profes-
sionals approach and act toward the process of designing
and using information systems is necessary. A definitive
answer regarding the design of organizations and infor-
mation systems cannot be given, unfortunately-it is a
highly contingent endeavor. The scale, structure, and
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technologies embedded in organizations that produce
and use complex data will vary according to the type of
data, target clientele, and purposes which the data serve.
Furthermore, organizational theory does not allow
someone to predict with any certainty what the likely
consequences or effects of particular types of organiza-
tional designs might be on the quality of the data, or
whether they are produced and used with greater
effectiveness or efficiency. It is therefore impossible to
predict or prescribe “optimal” organizational designs
that would consistently support the efficient and effective
production and use of complex data.
Nevertheless, the philosophic stance and commit-
ment must be to design information systems that more
closely reflect how people actually interact in social situ-
ations to ask questions, make discoveries, to learn, and
to solve problems. The approach discussed in this article
for designing information systems that produce and uti-
lize complex data requires a “distributed system of social
cognition’’—one that reflects how the social science en-
terprise is actually conducted. As such, this perspective
offers the potential for integrating a wider variety of tech-
nological innovations to improve the enterprise of social
science inquiry. The authors’ hope is that this discussion
will foster the necessary conversations that must occur
between members of those communities who produce
data, design information systems, and utilize data. In this
way, members of all communities can begin to more
fully develop systems, policies, procedures, and rules
that will significantly improve the production and utili-
zation of complex data.
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